In order to reduce the risk of complete failure, research managers often adopt a parallel strategy by simultaneously funding several R&D activities and several research teams within each activity. The parallel strategy requires the allocation of an available budget to a number of R&D activities, the determination of the number of research teams within each activity and the amount of funding they receive. We consider a formulation of this problem as a nonlinear resource allocation problem by Gerchak and Kilgour, IEE Trans. 31 (2) (1999) 145, and present a su cient condition as a function of problem parameters, under which closed-form solutions to the problem are obtained.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate closed-form solutions to a nonlinear resource allocation problem arising in the selection process among competing research and development (R&D) activities. (R&D) project managers face the challenge of exploring several choices to attain a particular objective. However, the outcome of these choices is usually uncertain, making the selection process a di cult one. Abernathy and Rosenbloom [1] suggested the use of a parallel strategy as a tool to deal with this uncertainty in a successful way. They deÿne a parallel strategy as "the simultaneous pursuit of two or more distinct approaches to a single task, when successful completion of any one would satisfy the task requirements." However, the adoption of the parallel strategy in a R&D project is associated with the crucial strategic question of determining how many parallel teams or approaches to a particular objective to fund. Gerchak and Kilgour [2] modeled di erent objectives to determine how many parallel independent research teams of equal potential to fund within only one research and development activity. Gerchak [3] extended these ideas to the case where more than a single activity is involved, and these activities have di erent priorities re ected in di erent weights. In another study by Gerchak [5] , a model with a single activity is considered where the achievements of competing teams are allowed to be interdependent. Gerchak and Parlar [4] tackle a similar problem using game theoretic approaches. In the present paper, we identify conditions under which the nonlinear and nonconvex optimization problem introduced by Gerchak and Kilgour [2] admits closed-form solutions. For a general and detailed exposition of resource allocation problems the interested reader is directed to the book [6] .
The optimization problem and main results
Gerchak and Kilgour [2] modeled the resource allocation problem as follows. They assume that (1) the future achievement of a research team is a continuous nonnegative random variable, (2) the research teams are independent, (3) the achievements of the research teams have identical probability distributions, given that their funding is done on an equal basis, and (4) the achievements of the funded teams are exponentially distributed. Suppose that the total available budget is B, and there are M potential research activities. For j = 1; 2; : : : ; M , let B j be the budget allocated to activity j and n j be the number of parallel research teams to work on activity j, each of which receives equal funding which amounts to B j =n j . The achievement of each team within activity j has an identical distribution function given by F j (x; B j =n j ), where B j =n j is related to the parameter of the distribution. The optimization problem consists in maximizing a weighted sum of the probabilities that the most successful team within each activity exceeds a speciÿc threshold value. Since the probability that the best team in activity j exceeds the threshold T j can be written as 1−[F j (T j ; B j =n j )] nj , the optimization problem is formulated as follows (see [2] ): max B1;:::; BM ;n1;:::; nM
where p j denotes the positive weight attached to activity j. Gerchak and Kilgour [2] set the parameter of the exponential distribution to = L(n=B) , where ∈ (0; 1] re ects the sensitivity of a research team to the budget allocation, and L is an appropriate constant. The case =1 indicates a high sensitivity where larger budget allocations would induce higher achievements. With multiple activities this problem translates into max B1:::; BM ;n1;:::; nM
Since the threshold values T j 's and the parameters L j 's are ÿxed, we can absorb L j into T j in the analysis without loss of generality. Therefore, we assume L j to be equal to one. We also suppose that the research teams' achievement is very sensitive to resource allocation. In other words, we set j = 1; j = 1; 2; : : : ; M . Therefore, the goal of maximizing the weighted sum of probabilities that the most successful team exceeds an activity-speciÿc threshold value Tj translates into min
where B =(B 1 ; : : : ; B M ); n and p are deÿned similarly. Before proceeding to the results, we present below an example with two activities. Let B=10; T 1 =T 2 =8. We plot in Fig. 1 the objective function for several choices of (n 1 ; n 2 ) as a function of B 1 , when L 1 = L 2 = 1. We observe that the curve corresponding to n 1 = n 2 = 1 lies below all the others. This observation is formally proved in Theorem 1. Furthermore, the function for n 1 = n 2 = 1 is neither convex nor concave but has three local minima, two of which are both global minima, namely B 1 = 0, and B 1 = 10.
In the rest of the paper, we use 1 to indicate a vector with all elements equal to one. For ease of notation, we deÿne r j = T j =B which can be interpreted as a scaled measure of the success threshold for activity j per unit budget. The higher this ratio gets, the smaller is the probability that an activity is considered successful. Hence, larger values of r j indicate higher levels of ambition for that activity. Proof. We ÿrst show that when r j ¿ln 2 for j = 1; 2; : : : ; M; f(B; 1; p) is smaller than or equal to f(B; n; p) for n¿1 (that is, each component is greater than or equal to one), for all values of B. Since
then, for any n¿1, the di erence f(B; n; p) − f(B; 1; p) is given by
Note that if n i = 1 for some i, the di erences corresponding to those i values will be zero and they will not contribute to the above sum. Letting
and omitting p i which is a positive multiplicative constant, the ith term in the previous expression is written as
This expression is zero when n i = 1, and otherwise its derivative with respect to n i is
This derivative vanishes when n i x i =ln 2, it is negative if n i x i ¡ ln 2, and positive if n i x i ¿ ln 2. Then,
is always nonnegative for all values of n i ¿1 if x i ¿ln 2. Thus, for all B; f(B; 1; p)6f(B; n; p) for n¿1 if T i B i ¿ln 2:
Since 0 ¡ B i ¡ B, a su cient condition is given as r i ¿ln 2:
Now suppose for some i 1 ; i 2 ; : : : ; i k ; n ij = 0 and the rest of the n j 's are 1. For simplicity, let i 1 = M − k + 1; i 2 = M − k + 2; : : : ; i k = M , so that the ÿrst M − k elements of n are 1 and the rest are zero and denote the corresponding n vector by n k . Then
Hence, a su cient condition for the theorem to hold is that r j ¿ln 2 ≡ min j r j ¿ln 2
We conclude from the above theorem that when r j ¿ln 2 for j = 1; : : : ; M , at most one research team in each activity can be funded. This result which may not seem intuitive at ÿrst sight can be attributed to the form of the objective function since the success of a team is measured by the tail probability of an exponential distribution. If the desired achievement rate per unit budget T j =B is high the policy avoids parallel funding in order to maintain the success level expressed by this small probability. Hence, other objective functions can result in di erent policies which may encourage more parallel funding.
The following theorem complements the above result by providing the optimal budget allocation. Deÿne c j = p j =2 aj for j = 1; : : : ; M where a j = r j =ln 2. then f(B; 1; p) is minimized at B i k = B; and B j =0; for all j = i k ; for k = 1; 2; : : : ; r. Furthermore; if it also holds that c * =p = (1=r) 1=r−1 ; then f(B; 1; p) is also minimized at B i k = B=r, for k = 1; 2; : : : ; r and B j = 0; for all j = i k .
where in X 2 , the single entry 1 occurs anywhere in the ÿrst r entries. Then
Then we see that (5) and (6) are equal if 1=2 a =c * =p= (1=r) 1=(r−1) .
Having established in Theorem 1 that only a single team within each activity should be funded when T j =B¿ln 2; ∀j = 1; : : : ; M , Theorem 2 states the following:
1. If there is a single activity that "dominates" in terms of its weight (c j ) then that activity receives all the available budget. 2. If several activities simultaneously "dominate" in terms of their weights, there are multiple optima where one of the dominating activities gets all the funding. Furthermore, if a certain condition on the maximum weight c * holds, there is yet another optimum funding scheme where all activities equally share the available budget.
Note that part 2 of Theorem 2 always holds without the condition on c * =p for M = 2. Also, it is enough to compute the c i values and select the maximum to ÿnd the activity that receives all the funding. As a simple illustration of the above theorem, consider the example in Fig. 1 . Here p 1 = p 2 = 1, and we compute c 1 = c 2 = 0:449329. Hence, clause 2 of the theorem applies and we have two global minima, (B 1 = 10; B 2 = 0) and (B 1 = 0; B 2 = 10).
Maximizing the expected number of teams achieving a threshold
In the foregoing discussion, we considered the probability that the most successful team within each activity exceeds a threshold and a weighted sum of these probabilities is aimed to be maximized. As an alternative objective, Gerchak [3] considers the problem of maximizing the expected number of teams attaining a pre-speciÿed threshold (Problem 3 in the above reference). Since, it is assumed that the teams within each activity work independently with an identical achievement distribution, the number of teams achieving a certain threshold will have a binomial distribution with parameters n i and p * i = [1 − F j (T j ; B j =n j )], where F j (·) corresponds to the achievement distribution of a team in activity j; j = 1; : : : ; M . If activities have di erent priorities re ected by p j 's as before, the objective function for M = 2; i = 1; i = 1; 2 becomes max B1;n1;n2
where B is taken is to be one without loss of generality. We brie y indicate below that the results obtained above also extend to this problem. In particular, we observe that f(B 1 ; n 1 ; n 2 ) ¿ f(B 1 ; n 1 ; 0) for all n 1 ¿1 and f(B 1 ; n 1 ; n 2 ) ¿ f(B 1 ; 0; n 2 ) for all n 2 ¿1. Further,
For n 2 ¿2, the above expression is always positive if ln 26T 2 , which follows from the arguments presented in the previous section. Similarly, we can show that f(B 1 ; 1; 1) − f(B 1 ; n 1 ; 1) is always nonnegative if ln 26T 1 holds. Therefore, the su cient condition for (n 1 ; n 2 ) = (1; 1) to be the optimal number of teams turns out to be that ln 26T i ; i = 1; 2, similar to the previous problem. The problem of ÿnding the optimal value of B 1 that maximizes f(B 1 ; 1; 1) also reduces to the previous problem since This seemingly counterintuitive result can again be explained by the tail probability expression involved in the objective function. On the other hand, the su cient conditions of the above results may be stronger than necessary. That is, if this condition is not satisÿed the optimal policy may still advocate funding a single team as exempliÿed in [3, Table 8 ].
Conclusion
In this paper, we obtained a su cient condition under which a nonlinear resource allocation problem introduced by Gerchak and Kilgour [2] admits closed-form solutions. The cases where the su cient condition fails to hold are deemed less interesting in applications by Gerchak and Kilgour [2] . Closed-form solutions in such cases are not possible as observed by Gerchak and Kilgour [2] through numerical experimentation since the optimal decision di ers from one case to another.
